Washington Law Review
Volume 14

Number 1

1-1-1939

Contracts to Devise Real Property
Willard J. Wright

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons

Recommended Citation
Willard J. Wright, Comment, Contracts to Devise Real Property, 14 Wash. L. Rev. & St. B.J. 30 (1939).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol14/iss1/3

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@uw.edu.

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
and

STATE BAR JOURNAL
Published Quarterly, in January,April, July and November of Each Year,
by the Washington Law Review Association, at the Law School
of the University of Washington. Founded by John T.
Condon, First Dean of the Law School.
SuBscmiRrioN PRICE: $1.20 PER ANNUM

EUGENE C. LUCCOCK
R. H. NOTTELMANN
JonN W. RICHARDS

-

-

SINGLE COPIES 50C

-

-

-

-

-

-

Editor-in-Chief

Associate Editor
Business Manager

STUDENT EDITORIAL BOARD OF THE LAW SCHOOL
MAX KAMINOFF,

HARDYN
DANIEL W. GAISER,

Note Editor

Harwood A. Bannister
William B. Bevis
Wayne C. Booth
Kenneth A. Cox
Harry M. Cross
John M. Davis
Russell V. Hokanson

President

SOULE, Vice-President
WILLARD J. WRIGHT,

James P. Hunter
Winston C. Ingman
Jack H. Jaffe
Robert K. Keller
Melvin D. Lurie
George M. Martin

Student Bus. Mgr.

Robert G. Moch
Wayne Murray, Jr.
Earl K. Nansen
Donald G. Simpson
Charles I. Stone
Lawrence W. Thayer
Harold M. Tollefson

COMMENTS
CONTRACTS TO DEVISE REAL PROPERTY
Contracts to devise real property are frequently entered into
and are generally held to be a valid mode of transferring realty.'
1
In Schirmer v. Nethercutt, 157 Wash. 172, 288 Pac. 265 (1930), the
court said at p. 179: "We have had many cases where agreements to bequeath or devise personal and real property to a favored beneficiary have
been upheld. There is nothing illegal or against public policy in such
contracts."
Also, in Johnson v. Hubbell, 10 N. J. Eq. 332, 66 Am. Dec. 773 (1855),
the court said: "The law permits a man to dispose of his own property
at his pleasure, and no good reason can be assigned 'why he may not
make a legal agreement to dispose of his property to a particular individual, or for a particular purpose, as well by will as by conveyance, to
be made at some specified future period, or upon the happening of some
future event."

COMMENTS
Very properly the courts view such contracts with suspicion,2
especially when orally made.
In order to prove the contract to devise real property some states
require that it be in writing, otherwise it will be deemed void.'
But the majority of courts are not so strict and an oral contract
if adequately proven is satisfactory. However, in proving oral
contracts some states require that the contract be proven "independent of the performance" 4 while other courts including Washington are more liberal and admit evidence of performance, or
change of position by the promisee as an element of proving the
contract itself.5 The intention of the promisor to contract may be
shown either by acceptance of services of the promisee by the
deceased promisor, or by any conduct indicating that he presently
binds himself to devise or transfer title to the real property in
question to the promisee, or simply by conversations of the deceased promisor with disinterested witnesses (an extremely liberal
view) .6 The major problem arises when the contract rests in parole,
as most often is the case, and the requirements of the Statute of
Frauds7 are encountered.
In Washington the Statute of Frauds does not bar recovery
under an oral contract to devise real property if there has been
part performance. In fact, in enforcing such a contract our court
declared in 1921:
"This court has more than once held that an oral contract of the character here mentioned is enforcible notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds, if there has been
full or partial performance. In fact that question seems
to be so well settled in this court that we deem it unnecessary to do more than cite some of the cases." 8
In the earlier decisions, the Washington Court required that performance be rendered by both the promisor and the promiseef
Whatever may have been the early theory requiring such performance by both parties, modernly, the court has held generally
that performance by the promisee alone is sufficient to take the
contract out of the Statute of Frauds.10 "Performance" by the
promisor (which, in the main, could consist only of the execution
of a will) does not alone take the contract out of the Statute of
-Henry v. Henry, 138 Wash. 284, 244 Pac. 686 (1926).
'Chandler v. Baker, 191 Mass. 579, 78 N. E. 387 (1906); Trout v. Ogilvie, 41 Cal. App. 167, 182 Pac. 333 (1919) (by amendment to the Code of
Civil Procedure of 1905).
'Salem v. Finney, 215 N. Y. S. 553 (1926).
uVelekanje v. Dickman, 98 Wash. 584, 168 Pac. 465 (1917).
°Avenetti v. Brown, 155 Wash. 517, 291 Pac. 469 (1930).
IREm. REv. STAT. § 5825; see also Eidinger v. Mamlock, 138 Wash. 276,
244 Pac. 684 (1926) at p. 282.
gIn an opinion by Judge Bridges in Andrews v. Andrews, 116 Wash.
513, 199 Pac. 981 (1921) the court citing Velikanje v. Dickman, 98 Wash.
584, 168 Pac. 465 (1917), Alexander v. Lewes, 104 Wash. 32, 175 Pac. 572
(1918), Worden v. Worden, 96 Wash. 592, 165 Pac. 501 (1917), Swash v.
Sharpenstein, 14 Wash. 426, 44 Pac. 862, 32 L. R. A. 796 (1896).
°Swash v. Sharpstein, 14 Wash. 426, 44 Pac. 862 (1896), at p. 435:
"The rule seems to be well settled that to enforce a parol contract to make
a will there must have been at least some substantial thing done by the
in his lifetime in pursuance of that contract."
testator
10
See cases in note 39, infra.
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Frauds. " ' The "full or partial performance" which is deemed
necessary to "satisfy" the Statute of Frauds may consist of special
services which are not compensable in money, such as nursing and
caring for the promisor with services of a unique nature1 , or
services of a relative 12 combined with love and affection for the
promisor. Such services are alone sufficient performance to support the validity of an oral contract to devise realty in Washington.
The strict rule of sufficient part performance requires possession
of the property to be devised in addition to the services rendered."
And such possession must be exclusively referable to the contract,
and occasioned by the contract. In Washington, however, following the liberal rule, there need be no possession of the property
promised,'1 4 although possession of the land is a factor strongly
in favor of the promisee. 5 Joint possession of the premises by the
promisor and the promisee is sufficient. 6
Performance of the oral agreement might also be made, not with
services, but by a change in the status quo of the promisee or the
assumption of a relation with the promisor different from that
which ordinarily exists in the absence of a contract. 7 Thus in
Velikanje v. Dickman, Judge Ellis said:
"O'McClanahan v. McClanahan, 77 Wash. 138, 137 Pac. 479 (1913), at p.
143: "The making of a will in pursuance of a contract required by the
Statute of Frauds to be evidenced by a writing, did not constitute a part

performance of such contract so as to render the same enforcible." See

also In re Edwall's Estate, 75 Wash. 391, 134 Pac. 1041 (1913).
"In a note on the subject in 69 A. L. R. 14, it is stated at p. 146:
"According to the great weight of authority, 'where it appears that the
promisee in a contract of the kind under consideration occupies some
peculiar relation to the promisor, or because of the latter's physical or
mental condition the services performed were of a kind the value of
which could not be fairly estimated according to any pecuniary standard,
the contract whether oral or written will be specifically enforced if it is
otherwise equitable."
Services of nursing a sick man, anid massaging him at odd hours of
the day and night and doing other "menial and disgusting tasks" were
considered as such services which "were not measurable in money" in
Velikanje v. Dickman, supra; see also Olsen v. Hoag, 128 Wash. 8, 221
Pac. 984 (1924).
2In McCullough v. McCullough, 153 Wash. 625, 280 Pac. 70 (1929), the
plaintiff was a grandniece of the promisor and was allowed to recover
under an oral contract to devise real property. Plaintiff's only services
were to allow the promisor to "bring her up as her own daughter".
Other Washington cases where a relative was involved include: Alexander v. Lewes, 104 Wash. 32, 175 Pac. 572 (1918); Avenetti v. Drown,
58 Wash. 517, 291 Pac. 469 (1930).
"Leading case: Burns v. McCormick, 233 N. Y. 230, 135 N. E. 273
(1922).
""Possession of the property is not a requisite where the consideration was personal care and services not measurable in money." Velikanje
v. Dickman,
svpra n. 5 at p. 595.
2
5In Worden v. Worden, 96 Wash. 592, 165 Pac. 501 (1917), the court
in reversing the lower court said: "It has been held that the taking of
possession and making improvements under an agreement for the devise
of certain land in consideration of caring for the owner until his death,
is an enforcible contract."
See also note in 69 A. L. R. at page 139 (1930).
"*Lautenschlager v. Smith, 155 Wash. 328, 284 Pac. 87 (1930); Slavin
v. Ackman, 119 Wash. 48, 204 Pac. 816 (1922); Alexander v. Lewes, supra.
"769 A. L. R. 133.
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"To refuse to enforce it (the contract) would work a
hardship on the boy who has abandoned his contemplated
scheme of life by reason of the old man's promises."' 8
Since the courts view oral agreements to devise real property
with caution and suspicion, the promisee must present "proof of
the most convincing nature to establish such an agreement". 1 The
Washington court requires proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" ;20
or "beyond all controversy"'" (if there be any distinction). One
Washington case 22 held that the same degree of evidence is not
required when there is an ineffectual will made in accordance with
an oral contract. But subsequent Washington cases involving simiwills require evidence "beyond all reasonable
lar "ineffectual"
2
doubt".

3

A written memorandum would, of course, take the contract out
of the Statute of Frauds if it qualified as a proper memorandum.
Some courts have allowed a revoked and hence unenforcible will
setting forth the devise of the promised real property, to come in
as a sufficient memorandum of the oral contract. 24 But Washington, following the more general rule, refuses to allow a revoked
will to constitute a memorandum of the contract, 25 nor can the
making of a will, subsequently revoked, constitute, of itself, part
2
performance of the oral contract to evade the Statute of Frauds,
but the Washington court has held that a revoked will is "strong
confirmatory proof that the alleged oral contract was entered
into.' 127
When the contract is in writing the confusion engendered by
the Statute of Frauds in oral contract cases is replaced by other
difficulties. Thus, in the recent hearings of the case of Y. M. C. A.
v. Murphy28 the court was perplexed by a written instrument
v. Dickman, supra note 5 at p. 497.
IsVellkanje
2
Eidinger v. Mamlock, 138 Wash. 276, 244 Pac. 684 (1926).
"Alexander v. Lewes, 104 Wash. 32, 175 Pac. 572 (1918).
21Lohse v. Spokane & Eastern Trust Co., 170 Wash. 46, 15 P. (2d) 271
(1932), wherein the court, referring to the rule of "reasonable doubt" said:
"We think a better statement is, that actions of this character must be sustained by testimony which is conclusive, definite and certain and beyond
all controversy." Frederick v. Michaelson, 138 Wash. 55,- 244 Pac. 119
(1926). And the most recent deliberation of the court on this subject
states the rule to be "beyond all legitimate controversy". Fischer v.
Soames, 96 Wash. Dec. 1, 81 P. (2d) 836 (August, 1938), citing both the
Alexander case and the Lohse case.
Vorden v. Worden, 96 Wash. 592, at p. 605, 165 Pac. 501 (1917).
'McCullough v. McCullough, 153 Wash. 625 at p. 629, 280 Pac. 70 (1929).
'Weeds v. Dunn, 81 Ore. 457, 159 Pac. 1155 (1916).
"McClanahan v. McClanahan, 77 Wash. 138, 137 Pac. 479 (1913).
"Supra note 10a.
-'Worden v. Worden, 96 Wash. 592, 165 Pac. 501 (1917); Alexander v.
Lewes. 104 Wash. 32, 175 Pac. 572 (1918) in which the court at p. 42 said:
"Here there is a writing that may serve to help to prove the contract. The
case is such, therefore, that it is not left wholly at the mercy of parol evidence. True, this writing is void, as a will, but that did not prevent it
from being good to help to prove the contract." See also, Olsen v. Hoag,
128 Wash. 8, 221 Pac. 500 (1924); McCullough v. McCullough, 153 Wash.
625, 280 Pac. 70 (1929).
1(a) 191 Wash. 180, 71 P. (2d) 6 (August, 1937), where the court
affirmed the lower court's decision for the plaintiff, en bane -by a 5-4
decision.
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which it refused to interpret as a contract to devise, although it is
submitted that such an interpretation was feasible and intended
by the promisor.29 The court found that the writing was testamentary in character and that no present interest passed, a holding
which has recently been criticised. 0 It was expressly stated in the
instrument that this "shall not be regarded as a gift or devise", 31
a statement which should operate to divest the instrument of its
testamentary character when coupled with the stipulated acts of
performance promised by the Y. M. C. A. Such a statement does
not prevent the instrument from being construed as a contract to
devise, however much it denies the making, in itself, of a devise or
a gift. The Washington Court has, heretofore, been liberal3 2 in
finding a contract to devise when orally made. Surely when the
contract is made more definite by a writing, the court should not
pursue a stricter rule.
Judge Robinson, dissenting in the final disposition of the case,
left this query:
"Will it be sufficient in attempting to enforce such
contracts (to devise) in the future to prove the contract
and its performance or is it going to be necessary to also
prove that a present interest passed?"" (Italics supplied.)
(br) 193 Wash. 400, 75 P. (2d) 916 (Feb., 1938), where on rehearing
the court sitting en banc reversed the lower court's decision and found
for the defendant (it is to be noted that in the interim between the first
and second decision Judge Simpson had replaced Judge Tolman, changing
the decisive vote to the other side, 5 to 4).
(c) 95 Wash. Dec. 537 (August, 1938), denying respondent's petition
for rehearing.
-The facts of the case are lriefly these: An instrument was executed
in which Murphy agreed to lease to the Y. M. C. A. a tract of land
suitable for a boys' camp. The lessee was to pay taxes and to construct
certain buildings, and If it failed to do so, or if it ceased to be a going
concern, the lease was to terminate in the discretion of the leqsor.
Otherwise, the lease was to continue until the lessor died or until a
guardian or trustee was appointed over the lessor's estate. In either of
these events his executor or guardian was empowered and ordered to
transfer the title to the lessee. The lessor died and the lessee petitioned
for a decree directing the executor to deliver a deed to the land. Held:
that as no present interest passed under the instrument, it was testamentary in character, and the land should go to the residuary legatees under
the lessor's will.
3186 U. oF PA. L. REv. 792 (May, 1938); 37 MicH. L. RFV. 167 (Novem-

ber, 1938).
"1See paragraphs 23 and 24 as quoted by the court In the Murphy case
in 191
Wash. at p. 186.
30
2 upra notes 5, 6.

"The majority opinion in Y. M. C. A. v. Murphy, 193 Wash. 400, stated
at p. 409: "An instrument, however, although partly or wholly in the
form of a contract is testamentary in character and operative if at all
as a will, where it is to have no operation during the party's lifetime
and disposes or attempts to dispose of his property at his death and not
before." The court then found that "the contract discloses no intention
on the part of Murphy to transfer to the respondent any present interest
other than the leasehold interest"; the court held the instrument to be
testamentary and invalid for not conforming to the Statute of Wills.
It is to this language and holding that Judge Robinson directs his question after citing the long line of Washington cases on contracts to devise
real property in which no mention is made of the requirement of a present
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It is submitted that the holding in the Murphy case does not require that the passing of a present interest be shown in contracts
to devise real property. Actually, the court did not consider the
problem presented in the Murphy case from the point of view of a
contract to devise and, in fact, originally the contending parties
agreed that the instrument involved was not such a contract. 84 A
necessary distinction must be drawn between a valid contract to
devise and a transaction which is purely testamentary in character.
The latter looks to the future and has no force or effect until the
death of the "promisor" and thus is testamentary in character and
must conform to the Statute of Wills. 85 A contract to devise, however, becomes binding immediately upon inception and as will be
seen is enforcible under certain circumstances even before the
death of the promisor.38 Future dispositions of property, however,
are not necessarily testamentary. If "some quantum of present
interest" passes the transaction will not be considered a testamentary disposition of property.17 In the Murphy case the court
treated the transaction as a future disposition of the property involved and the issue then centered about whether a present interest
passed to relieve it of its testamentary character. The view expressed by the majority suggests that in cases where the transaction is "in the form of a contract"," but is to have no operation
during the lifetime of the promisor, it becomes of utmost importance to determine whether or not a present interest passes to the
promisee. But clearly, a valid contract to devise real property is
more substance than "form" and does "operate" during the
party's lifetime by binding both parties thereto as in any contract. Therefore, it seems that there need be no concern over the
question of whether "some quantum of present interest" passes
to the promisee and the Statute of Wills does not operate to defeat
a contract of this character. None of the Washington cases on such
interest. Judge Robinson concludes as the answer to his own query that
"the denial of the petition for rehearing must be construed as being
tantamount to a declaration that, in the future, it will be necessary
to prove the passing of a present interest and therefore, it may be said
that the law is not left uncertain."
"In the respondent's original answering brief at page 42 there is the
following: "The instrument is not a contract to make a will. Appellants
err In stating that we contended below that the instrument 'must be
construed as a contract to make a will.' (Ap. Br. p. 26.) We did not so

contend, and we make no such contention now." Thus, it appears that

the issue as to whether there was a contract to devise or not was not
made and in fact the parties- argued simply on whether or not a "present
interest passed". It is true, however, that in its petition for rehearing
and motion for judgment, the respondent included in its 'brief a memorandum of an anonymous attorney which contended that the true issue
in the case Was whether a contract to devise existed and hence that "the
case has not been made to turn upon the question which is solely determinative of what the result should be". But the opinion of the court
Went entirely on the question of whether a present interest passed and
not on whether a contract to devise existed.
mSee 68 CoRPus JuRis 618, No. 238.
'See infra notes 43 and 44.
"Note 10 L. R. A. 93; 68 C. J. 618.
3Murphy case, supra 193 Wash. at p. 409.

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
contracts either prior 39 or subsequent 0 to the Murphy case gives
any weight to, much less, mentions the Statute of Wills or the requirement that a present interest pass.
Once the contract to devise is established and, if oral, satisfies
the Statute of Frauds, or, if written, is not testamentary in character, the promisee, in the event of breach, should be granted
relief. The promisee may obtain "specific performance"." This is
granted where the promisor dies without performing. A more difficult problem is presented where, before his death and before completion of performance, the promisor repudiates the contract or
attempts to convey away all his right, title, and interest in the
realty to some third party. In such a situation specific performance
is not available since, by the terms of the contract, the property is
not to be transferred to the promisee until the death of the promisor. But where the promisee has rendered continued performance
and is ready, willing and able to continue such performance, the
courts will sustain an action for damages, 42 or if damages are
inadequate and the promisor threatens conveyance, equity will
enjoin such conveyance, 43 or if a conveyance to a third party with
"Swash v. Sharpstein, 14 Wash. 426, 44 Pac. 862 (1896); Worden v.
Worden, 96 Wash. 592, 165 Pac. 501 (1917); Velikanje v. Dickman, 98
Wash. 584, 168 Pac. 465 (1917); Alexander v. Lewes, 104 Wash. 32, 175
Pac. 572 (1918); Olsen v. Hoag, 128 Wash. 8, 221 Pac. 984 (1924); Perkins
v. Allen, 133 Wash. 455, 234 Pac. 25 (1925); Fields v. Fields, 137 Wash.
592, 293 Pac. 369 (1926); Frederick v. Michaelsen, 138 Wash. 55, 244
Pac. 119 (1926); Henry v. Henry, 138 Wash. 284, 244 Pac. 686 (1926);
McCullough v. McCullough, 153 Wash. 625, 280 Pac. 70 (1929); Avenetti
v. Brown, 158 Wash. 517, 291 Pac. 469 (1930); Lohse v. Spokane Trust
Co., 170 Wash. 46, 15 P. (2d) 271 (1932); Clark v. Crist, 178 Wash. 187,
34 P. (2d) 360 (1934); Lager v. Brown, 187 Wash. 462, 60 P. (2d) 99
(1936); Resor v. Shaefer, 193 Wash. 91, 74 P. (2d) 917 (1937).
4Wayman v. Miller, 95 Wash. Dec. 380, 81 P. (2d) 501 (July, 1938);
Fischer v. Soames, 96 Wash. Dec. 1, 81 P. (2d) 836 (August, 1938).
""Strictly speaking, an agreement to dispose of property by will cannot
be specifically enforced. Yet courts of equity can do what is equivalent
to a specific performance of such an agreement, by compelling those upon
whom the legal title has descended to convey or deliver the property in
accordance with its terms, upon the ground that it is charged with a trust
in the hands of the heir at law, devisee, personal representative, or purchaser with notice of the agreement, as the case may be." Worden v.
Worden, 96 Wash. 592, 165 Pac. 501 (1917), at 609. See also McCullough
v. McCullough, supra note 12; 12 Wis. L. REv. 402.
'-Carter v. Witherspoon, 156 Miss. 597, 126 So. 388 (1930); Stone v.
Burgeson, 215 Ala. 23, 109 So. 155 (1926); Mug v. Ostendorf, 49 Ind. App.
71, 96 N. E. 780 (1911); Chantland v. Sherman, 148 Iowa 352, 125 N. W.
871 (1910), where the court said: "Such an agreement may not be specifically enforced until the death of the party agreeing to execute the will.
The reason for this is that the will may be made at any time during
life. But upon repudiation of such an agreement by denying its existence,
or by disposing of the property to be willed, a cause of action may accrue
for the enforcement of the agreement through analogous relief, recission,
or the recovery of damages. Otherwise, performance might be defeated
by rendering this impossible by the disposition of the property, or through
inability to prove the contract after the death of the promisor." Also,
Richardson v. Richardson, 114 Minn. 12, 130 N. TV. 4 (1901).
43Lovett v. Lovett, 87 Ind. App. 42, 155 N. E. 528, 157 N. E. 104 (1927);
White v. Massee, 202 Iowa 1304, 211 N. W. 839, 66 A. L. R. 1434 and
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notice of the agreement has already been made, equity will impose
a trust upon the property in the hands of such third party in favor
of the promisee.44 It would seem that if the contract to devise is
not recorded and the third party is a bona fide purchaser for value
without notice, there is no remedy available against the property
conveyed or the third party, but the promisee under the contract
will have to 45
resort to an action of damages against the promisor
or his estate.
WMLARD J. WRIGHT.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE FACT FINDINGS OF THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
Section 5 of the Trade Commission Act (15 U. S. C. § 45) and
Section 11 of the Clayton Act (15 U. S. C. § 21) provide that "The
findings of the Commission as to facts, if supported by testimony,
shall be conclusive." This follows the form of the usual statutory
provision, and its settled interpretation is that the findings of the
administrative board, if supported by substantial evidence, are
conclusive as to issues of fact.'
The purpose of the creation of the Trade Commission was largely
to establish an administrative tribunal consisting of a body of
persons especially qualified by reason of information, experience
and study to administer the federal program against unfair competition and monopoly. The Trade Commission Act took the function of gathering evidence entirely out of the hands of the courts
and vested it in the Commission. The Commission was given the
power to employ experts and examiners, including attorneys,
econ2
omists, accountants and specialists in various fields. It would
seem, therefore, that by the terms "conclusive, if supported by
testimony" Congress had it in mind that the administrative specialist rather than the court would determine the facts and draw
the inferences therefrom.' The test, then, which both logic and
note (1927). See also Hayes v. Moffatt, 83
5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. Ed., 1936)
"See McCullough v. McCullough, 153
(1929); Osborn v. Hoyt, 181 Cal. 336, 184
Vreeland, 11 N. J. Eq. 370 (1857).
'Van Duyne v. Vreeland, supra note 44.

Mont. 214, 271 Pac. 433 (1928);
§ 1421.
Wash. 625, 631, 280 Pac. 70
Pac. 854 (1919); Van Duyne v.

'Rankin v. Hoyt, 4 How. 327 (U. S. 1846) (custom appraiser); Decatur v. Paulding, 14 Pet. 497 (U. S. 1840) (pension board); United States
v. Ju Joy, 198 U. S. 253 (1905) (immigration 9fficial); Public Clearing
House v. Cayne, 194 U. S. 495 (1904) (post office department); Smelting
Co. v. Kemp, 104 U. S. 636 (1881) (land office); United States v. Williams,
278 U. S. 255 (1929) (director of veterans' bureau); Murray's Lessees
v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. 272 (U. S. 1856) (revenue
official); Gaines v. Thompson, 7 Wall 347 (U. S. 1869) (secretary of interior); Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U. S. 106 (1904) (postmaster
general); Zakonite v. Wolf, 226 U. S. 272 (1912) (secretary of commerce).
',ollefson, JudicialReview of the Decisions of the Federal Trade Commission, 4 Wis. L. Rv. 257.

$"If the findings of the Interstate Commerce Commission are final,

